Washington Law Review
Volume 20

Number 2

4-1-1945

Acknowledgment—Duty of Auditor to Record—Curative
Statute—Statutory Construction; Gifts—Time of Taking Effect—Gift
of United States Bonds
M. B. K.
W. A. Z.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr

Recommended Citation
M. B. K. & W. A. Z., Recent Cases, Acknowledgment—Duty of Auditor to Record—Curative
Statute—Statutory Construction; Gifts—Time of Taking Effect—Gift of United States Bonds, 20 Wash. L.
Rev. & St. B.J. 121 (1945).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol20/iss2/5

This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

1945)

COMMENT

contract they intended to have, if it does not violate public policy."'
By striking the inconsistent remedy the court gives effect to the
lawful intent of the parties, whereas construing the purported conditional sales contract as a chattel mortgage is to overlook the declared
intent and to invite a new contract.
LuciLE LOMEN.
':

For a collection of cases see 92 A. L. R. 305.

RECENT CASES
AcKNowLEDGVnNT-DTY OF AuDITOR TO RECOD--CURATIVE STATUTESTATUTORY CONSTRUcTION. In 1916, A, B, and C purchased a parcel of real
estate. Title was taken by C for convenience. C executed a "declaration of
trust" reciting that he held the property for the benefit of A, B and himself. The instrument was signed but not acknowledged. C died in 1942.
Thereafter A and B presented the instrument to the county auditor, tendered the required fee, and requested that it be recorded. The auditor
refused to accept it on the ground that it was not acknowledged as required by statute. A and B applied for a writ of mandamus to compel
recordation. Auditor's demurrer was sustained and A and B appealed.
Held: The county auditor may not be compelled to record an instrument
which fails to attain the statutory requirement as to acknowledgment.
Eggert v. Ford, 21 Wn. (2d) 152, 150 P. (2d) 719 (1944).
The statutes applicable to the question raised are as follows:
Rmvr. REv. STAT. § 10596: "A conveyance of real property, when
acknowledged by the person executing the same (the acknowledgment being certified as required by law), may be recorded
in the office of the recording officer of the county where the
property is situated. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
REm. REV. STAT. § 10596-10: "A recording officer, upon payment
or tender to him of the lawful fees therefor, shall record in his
office any instrument authorized or permitted by this act to be so
recorded."
BRm R v. S TAT. § 10599: "Every instrument in writing purporting to convey or encumber real estate situated in this state, or
any interest therein, which has been recorded in the auditor's
office of the county in which such real estate is situated, although
such instrument may not have been executed and acknowledged,
in accordance with the law in force at the time of its execution,
shall impart the same notice to third persons, from the date of
recording, as if the instrument had been executed, acknowledged,
and recorded, in accordance with the laws regulating the execution, acknowledgment and recording of such instrument then in
force."
REm. REv. STAT. § 10601: "He must, upon payment of his fees for
the same, record separately in large and well-bound books:
"(1) Deeds, grants and transfers of real property, mortgages
and releases of mortgages of real estate, powers of attorney to
convey real estate, and leases which have been acknowledged or
proved: ... ;
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(7) All such other papers or writings as are required by law
to be recorded and such as are required by law to be filed if requested so to do by the party filing the same."
The appellants contended that the county auditor must record any
instrument presented to him, that this duty is mandatory under Rxma. R v.
STAT. § 10601, and that while REm. REV. STAT. § 10596-2 sets out what may
be recorded when acknowledged, there is no statutory inhibition against
recording an unacknowledged instrument, and finally, when once recorded
but unacknowledged, REm. REv. STAT. § 10599 would operate to make the
unacknowledged instrument constructive notice to third parties, thus curing the lack of acknowledgement.
This particular question, whether a keeper of records may deny recordation to such an extrinsically imperfect instrument has seldom been
raised. The case of Peoplev. Fromme, 35 App. Div. 459, 54 N. Y. S. 833 (1898),
wherein a recording officer was mandamused to record an instrument
affecting title to real propetry, is distinguishable from the instant case
as the only defect in the instrument, apparently, was a lack of sufficient
stamps as required by the U. S. Revenue Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 448. There
being nothing in the New York statutes requiring revenue stamps makes it
clear the recorder was attempting to exercise a power not his as a recorder.
The only case uncovered by the Washington Supreme Court, and this
writer as well, which is in point is People v. Donegan, 226 N. Y. 84, 123
N.E. 71 (1919). There a deed was executed by four grantors, one of them
failing to meet the statutory requirements as to acknowledgment. The court
allowed the instrument to be recorded but held the record would not as
to subsequent purchasers be notice in favor of him whose acknowledgment
was defective, and had he been the sole grantor the instrument could not
have been lawfully recorded.
Statutes require acknowledgment chiefly to afford proof of the due
execution of the instrument sufficient to authorize the officer to record
it. 7 Thompson on Real Property (2d ed. 1940) § 3991. To dispense with
acknowledgments would simplify casting a cloud on anyone's title by
having recorded an instrument purporting to be a bona fide conveyance
from the grantor whose name merely appeared thereon but whose acknowledgment was lacking.
REm. REV. STAT. § 10596-2 provides when a conveyance of real property
is acknowledged and said acknowledgment is certified as required by law
it "may" be recorded. While the word "may" is generally permissive, when
a fair interpretation of the statute requires it, when certain prerequisite
conditions must exist or be performed before "other powers can be exercised," or when the prerequisites are designed to protect the citizen and
his property rights, the statute is to be regarded as mandatory. Black on
Interpretation of Laws (2d ed. 1911) p. 530.

Although REM. REv. STAT. § 10601 is by its terms mandatory, it seems
reasonable to construe it as such only to the extent that there is compliance with REM. REV. STAT. § 10596-2 which provides for acknowledgment, or REM. REv. STAT. § 10551 which requires as an element of a "deed"
that the instrument be acknowledged. To regard REM. REV. STAT. § 10599,
then, as enlarging REm. REV. STAT. § 10596-2 would in effect make legal
nullities of the parts of the latter, REm. REv. STAT. § 10601, and REm. REv.
STAT. § 10551 which specifically require acknowledgment.
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A vigorous dissent by three of the judges in the principal case raised
the objection that to allow the auditor to exercise any iscretionary power
would make for wide disparities in recording practice from one county to
another and allow recording to be at the caprice and whim of an individual. It is submitted that this is not too persuasive an objection because
the county auditor is charged with knowledge of the statutes pertaining
to his official duties, and in rejecting an unacknowledged instrument is
merely functioning in a ministerial capacity in conformity with the statutes. While a view in support of the minority opinion was taken in
Rehm v. Riley, 161 Wash. 418, 424, 297 Pac. 147, 149, 74 A. L. R. 350, 355
(1931), by way of dictum, the instant case resolves the point. On the basis
of this dictum one textwriter lists Washington as adopting the minority
view which does not make acknowledgment a prerequisite to recordation.
8 Thompson on Real Property (2d ed. 1940) § 4343 n. 71, § 4355 n. 30.
An interesting collateral question assumed by both appellant and
respondent in their briefs and not passed upon squarely by the court is
the proper construction of Rmvr. Rsv. STAT. § 10599. This statute as it
presently appears is a reenactment of § 2323 of the Code of 1881, 1 H. C.
§ 1440. The latter repealed by implication an act entitled "Curing Defective
Instruments" of WiAsH. TErm. LAws 1873, p. 481. The joint committee on
Revision of Laws introduced the 1929 legislation (Sen. Bill No. 11), Wash.
Laws 1929, c. 33, § 8, and commensurate with its avowed purpose of
merely rewording existing statutes to embrace prior judicial interpretation, made no appreciable change in the content or meaning of § 2323
of the CODE OF 1881. Peculiarly enough, there is no known case wherein
a deed or other form of conveyance or encumbrance has been recorded
subsequent to 1881 whereby the court has had to pass squarely on the
proper construction to be given this statute.
It is further submitted that the legislative history of the statute gives
rise to two alternative implications: (1) § 2323 of the CODE OF 1881 and the
Act of 1929 were both operative restrospectively only, and another curative
act must be passed to effectuate the recording of defective instruments
from 1929 to date; or (2) § 2323 of the CODE OF 1881, which superseded the
curative Act of 1873, was intended to be prospective in scope, and hence all
defective instruments recorded subsequent to 1881 are as valid now as if
executed properly in the first instance.
The latter view seems more logical when it is remembered that fortyeigfit years have, in effect, passed since there has been a curative act,
as the 1929 enactment was merely a restatement of § 2323 of the CODE OF
1881. It seems only reasonable, then, when one considers the purpose -of
the Joint Committee on Revision of Laws that, desite the fact Rmv. REv.
STAT. § 10599, supra, was enacted two years later in point of time than
the general recording act, Raa. REv. STAT § 10596-2, supra, the former
should not be regarded as an enlargement upon the latter.
The dicta in Davidson v. National Can Co., 150 Wash. 370, 376, 273 Pac.
185,187 (1928), and in the instant case also, seem to indicate that when Rmv.
REv. STAT. § 10599 is squarely before the court for construction it will be
regarded as having been presently operative since 1881.
M. B. K.
Gnrs-TnvE OF TA=Nr. EFmcT---Gin OF U rrw STATES BONDS. In 1940-41,
A purchased two groups of United States Bonds-series D and E. The
series D bonds were payable to B after ten years. The series E bonds were
identical but the proceeds would revert to A on the death of B. No
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physical delivery of the bonds was made before A died in 1942. The bonds
were excluded from the estate of A. In this action the State Inheritance
Tax Division contends: (1) that the gift of the bonds was not complete and
should be part of A's estate and subject to inheritance tax; (2) that the
decedent had a taxable interest in the series E bonds even if the gift
were complete, under REM. REv. STAT. (supp. 1937) § 11201, PPC (1943)
7051. Held: (1) that the gift of the bonds was complete; (2) that decedent's interest in the series E bonds was not taxable. Inheritance Tax
Division v. Chamberlin Estate, 121 Wash. Dec. 756, 153 P. (2d) 305 (1944).
After finding that A actually intended to make a gift of the money
represented by the bonds, the Supreme Court goes on to construe their
wording to constitute an actual relinquishment by A of all rights and
title to the proceeds. Therefore A's physical possession of the bonds was
meaningless in so far as it tended to deny a completed gift to B. The
gift was complete at the time the money was paid to the United States
and the bonds were issued. In considering the importance of the estate's
reversionary interest in the series E bonds, the Court again takes
judicial notice of the probability that a child will outlive an adult. For
previous judicial acknowledgment on that point see In re Eaton's Estate,
170 Wash. 280, 16 P. (2d) 433 (1932). As a result they find that that interest
does not fall within our statute, REm. Ray. STAT. (supp. 1939) § 11206,
PPC(1943) § 7507, which in effect states that all reversionary interests
included in an estate are taxed on the basis of probabilities rather than
possibilities.
The principal case is the latest step toward re-establishing the status of
Baby Bonds-or War Savings Bonds, as they are now known. That status
was rendered uncertain by the principle laid down in Decker v. Fowler.
199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254, 131 A. L. R. 961 (1939), that the gift to the
beneficiary of series E bonds purchased by the decedent was not complete and therefore the proceeds became part of the decedent's estate. That
case is criticized in Comment (1939) 14 Wash. Law Rev. 312, which
suggests that an opposite result-and one more harmonious with existing
law and the intent of the purchaser of the bonds-could have been reached
if a contract donee-beneficiary theory were used. The statute, REM. REV.
STAT. (supp. 1943) §§ 11548-60, 61, passed by the Washington Legislature to
ameliorate the effect of Decker v. Fowler, supra, is discussed in Comment
(1943) 18 WASH. L. REy. 162. Although the principal case offered another
opportunity to clarify our law on donee-beneficiaries, the Court has again
see fit to remain silent on the subject.
W. A. Z.

